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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MAMIE NUNNELLY et al.,
Plaintiffs and AppeUants,
vs.
No. 6657
OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS OGDEN FIRST FEDERAL
SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, COLONIAL
CORPORATION, M. L. DYE AND S. G. DYE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In their "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" appearing on
pages 1-3 of their brief, appellants inadvertently fail to
mention various allegations and omissions in their complaint which preclude a class suit and unmistakably disclose a misjoinder of parties and causes of action.
(Except as otherwise indicated, the italics herein are ours.)
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Under appropriate titles we shall later discuss the
motions to strike and the uncertainty of various allegations
of the complaint.
In paragraph 11 of the complaint (R. 3-4) it is alleged
that plaintiff Nunnelly was the owner of an investment
certificate in the Association on or about the year 1937 and
that the other plaintiffs respectively owned designated investment certificates on or about the year 1935.
In paragraph 13 of the complaint (R. 4) it is alleged
that "during the years 1934, 1935 and 1936" said Association came into possession and still has possession of said
certificates and that same were thus obtained from plaintiffs through the alleged frauds set forth in the complaint,
with no payment of said certificates or any part thereof
"except various property of no substantial value." The
"various property" is not identified or described and no
offer to return same is made.
In paragraph 14 of the complaint (R. 4-5) the alleged
frauds are enumerated, consisting of claimed representations brought to the attention of plaintiffs and others similarly situated that said certificates had slight if any value,
concealment from them of the true condition of the Association, and manipulation and depression of the market for
such certificates. Said frauds are alleged to have been pursuant to a conspiracy entered into in the year 1933 by "all
of the defendants, together with certain other persons who
were directors of the corporations." How or in what manner
or by what means the alleged concealment or the alleged
manipulation or depression of the market was accomplished
or why the alleged frauds were not earlier discovered does
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not appear. It is also alleged in said paragraph 14 that the
corporate defendants "diverted from their respective treasuries large sums of money equitably belonging to said certificate holders and paid out the same for expenses and for
commissions to said agents" and "to some extent" and "in
some instances" funds thus diverted were used to pay for
investment certificates procured from plaintiffs. Although
no claim is made that any plaintiff has ever been a stockholder of defendants Colonial Corporation or Atlas Realty
Company and the complaint is silent as to how or why the
alleged money "diverted from their respective treasuries"
belonged to plaintiffs or was of concern to them or any of
them, an accounting therefor is demanded in the second
paragraph of the prayer of the complaint (R. 7).
In paragraph 15 of the complaint (R. 5-6), without
giving any information as to the time or place of any of the
respective transactions with the respective plaintiffs or as
to the identity of persons present or participating therein,
or as to the consideration paid for any certificate of any
plaintiff or any other term or condition of any alleged contract which any plaintiff now seeks to have rescinded, it is
alleged that plaintiffs "did part with their certificates without receiving payment therefor, except as hereinabove
stated."
In paragraph 16 of the complaint (R. 6) it is alleged
that "the defendants" have misappropriated Association
money for excessive salaries to the defendant Dyes and for
illegitimate expenses in the commission of said frauds.
In paragraph 17 of the complaint (R. 6) it is alleged
that in the year 1937 "the said defendants Dye and the
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defendant corporations" fraudulently transferred $85,000.00
worth of Association assets to defendant Colonial Corporation. The complaint is silent as to any possible concern of
any of the other defendants in this alleged transaction.
In paragraph 18 of the complaint (R. 6) it is alleged
that defendant Association and Colonial Corporation are
and for several years past have been "insolvent."
In paragraph 19 of the complaint (R. 6-7) it is alleged
that the amounts due plaintiffs and other investment certificate holders similarly situated are so large that said
Association cannot pay them in full and a prorating of assets
would therefore be necessary.
Plaintiffs pray (R. 7) : (1) that the status of plaintiffs
be adjudicated, that they be adjudged to be the owners of
said certificates and "that they have judgment against the
defendants for the unpaid amounts thereof"; (2) that
there be an accounting by all defendants in respect of all
matters alleged in the complaint; (3) that defendants be
enjoined from canceling said certificates; ( 4) that a receiver
be appointed to take charge of and conserve the assets of
the defendant A~sociation and Colonial Corporation; (5)
that judgment be entered against Colonial Corporation "to
the use of the defendant Ogden First Federal Savings and
Loan Association and the plaintiffs" for an accounting and
return to the treasury of the assets transferred to Colonial
Corporation; (6) that there be a marshaling of assets and
liabilities of defendant Association and a liquidation thereof and a distribution of its assets among those entitled thereto; and (7) for general relief, costs of suit and "for attorney's fees."

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
We shall endeavor to follow the order of discussion
adopted in appellants' brief.

WHAT CAUSE OR CAUSES OF ACTION ARE STATED?

It is true that we demurred to the complaint upon the
ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action in favor of plaintiffs or any of them and
against the demurring defendants and that the trial court
overruled the demurrer. In support of this ruling appellants
spear-head their discussion with citation of the Badger case,
94 Utah 97, and the Markey case, 186 So. 757. The Badger
case was a suit at law to recover an unpaid balance due on
a fully matured certificate. The Markey case was a suit at
law to recover damages occasioned by the fraudulent acts
complained of.
Upon the trial our general demurrer did not succeed
in "smoking out" (of record) the kind of suit upon which
appellants intended to rely. But on page 9 of their brief
in this Court, to avoid the dilemma which even they recognize would exist in an action at law, appellants say that
this case is "one in equity." Here, as in the Badger case,
it is alleged that part payment only of the debt evidenced
by the allegedly rna tured certificates has been made, and a
money judgment is demanded for the "unpaid amounts
thereof." Obviously the statement of this cause of action
at law and the tort action for damages impelled the trial
court to overrule the general demurrer. Any claimed cause
of action in equity for recission of the transactions complained of is fatally defective for failure to tender back
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the "various property" or other considerations received by
the respective appellants without offering any excuse for
such failure.
In 9 C. J., at page 1241, the law is thus stated:
"In nearly all jurisdictions a bill is demurrable
in which complainant does not offer to return any
consideration which it shows that he has received,
or otherwise place defendant in statu quo, or sufficiently excuse himself from this duty."
In Rosenthyne v. Matthews-McCullock Co. et al., 51
Utah 38, 168 Pac. 957, reference is made to said 9 C. J.
at pages 1207-1219, where the well-settled law in harmony
with our contention is announced, and this Court says (pp.
43-4 of the Utah report) that the law there stated is "the
doctrine which controls in such cases."
To same effect see :
Kelly et al. v. Kershaw, 5 Utah 29·5, 14 Pac. 804,
at p. 296 of the Utah report;·
21 c. J., p. 400;
12 c. J. s., p. 1004;
In re Fox West Coast Theatres, 88 Fed. (2d)
212 (9th C. C. A.) ;
Gillette et al. v. Oberholtzer et al., 264 Pac. 229,
at 230;
Higgins v. First National Bank, 183 Atl. 197
(N. J.), at 198;
De Lange v. Ogden et al., 106 S. W. (2d)
385 (Texas), at 302.
As appears from the allegations of the complaint above
summarized, it contains :
( 1) The alleged causes of action in contract of the
respective appellants (each separate and distinct from the
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others, no two of which arise out of "the same transaction,"
and no appellant having any title or interest in or right to
prosecute any cause of action except his own or to complain of any breach by the Association of its contract with
any other appellant) for a money judgment representing, as
in the Badger case, the difference between the amount paid
and the amount alleged to be due from the Association on
the certificates;
(2) Allegation and demand for recission of each of
the separate and distinct transactions whereby the respective plaintiffs are alleged to have parted with their stock,
no appellant having any interest in or right to complain of
any transaction except that to which he was a party;
(3) The separate and distinct alleged causes of action
of the respective appellants in tort for conspiracy (no appellant having any concern in or right to complain of the
insufficiency of any consideration moving to other appellants or to question or complain of any alleged false representations other than those made to and believed and relied
upon by him) with a prayer for judgment not only against
the Association issuing the certificates but against the two
other corporate defendants and each and all of the individual defendants for an amount that would be the proper measure of damage under such a cause of action, to wit, the difference between the respective amounts paid and the matured value of the certificates;
( 4) Causes of action of the respective appellants for
an accounting with respect to alleged improper and excessive commissions paid to agents and the right to recover
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which is vested in the corporations alleged to have paid
same, to wit, the Association and Colonial Corporation;
( 5) Causes of action of the respective appellants for
an accounting with respect to alleged excessive salaries paid
by the Association to the defendant Dyes, which causes of
action if any are vested in said Association;
(6) Causes of action of the respective appellants to
set aside the alleged fraudulent conveyance to Colonial Corporation, which causes of action if any are vested in the
Association;
(7) The various causes of action of the respective
plaintiffs against defendants, including the Association, and
their cause of action in behalf of the Association "for an
accounting and return to" its treasury of the assets alleged
to have been turned over to Colonial Corporation. The
Association is both plaintiff and defendant.
We very much doubt if a more extraordinary example
of "shotgun" pleading than this complaint has ever been
filed in any court. Accepting certain of its allegations as
true, it is "just like the Badger case"-a suit at law to
recover a balance due under the contracts alleged. Other
allegations and the prayer for a money judgment against
all defendants brand it as a tort action at law to recover
damages for the alleged frauds. And, as above indicated,
appellants say that the suit is "one in equity." Obviously
the causes of action in contract and in tort are in irreconcilable conflict with the cause of action in equity for rescission.
In Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 69 Utah 161, 253
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Pac. 196, the well-settled law in this and other jurisdictions
relative to election of rights and remedies is thus stated at
page 169 of the Utah report:
"It is well settled that one who is induced to
make a sale or trade by the deceit of a vendee has
the choice of two remedies upon his discovery of the
fraud; he may affirm the contract and sue for his
damages, or he may rescind it and sue for the property he has sold or what he has paid out on the
contract. The former remedy counts upon the affirmance or validity of the transaction, the latter
repudiates the transaction and counts upon its invalidity. The two remedies are inconsistent, and the
choice of one rejects the other, because the sale
cannot be valid and void at the same time."
THE COMPLAINT IS MULTIFARIOUS
In addition to 104-3-16, U. C. A., cited on page 8 of
appellants' brief and which provides that "when the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are numerous and. it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all," another section of our
Code, to wit, 104-7-3, U. C. A., is pertinent and controlling.
It reads as follows :
"The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint
several causes of action, legal or equitable or both,
where they all arise out of :
" ( 1) The same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action; or,
"(2) Contract, express or implied; or
"(3) Injuries, with or without force, to person
and property, or either; or,
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'' ( 4) Injuries to character; or,
" ( 5) Claims to recover real property with or

without damages for the withholding thereof, and the
rents and profits of the same, or waste committed
thereon ; or,
"(6) Claims to recover personal property, with
or without damages for the withholding thereof; or,
"(7) Claims against a trustee by virtue of a
contract or by operation of law.
"But the causes of action so united must all
belong to one of these classes, and, except in actions
for the foreclosure of mortgages and of other liens,
must affect all the parties to the action, must not
require different places of trial, and they must be
separately stated."
It will be observed that the last quoted section expressly
refers to "equitable" as well as legal causes of action. The
constitutionality of said section has not as yet been questioned. The codes of many States include sections in substance identical with 104-3-16 and 104-7-3, U. C. A. The
courts of those States, without a single exception, construe
those sections as forbidding joinder of parties and causes
of action as has been attempted in the case at bar.
Even had the cited Utah statutes never been enacted
and were the equity practice (old or new) controlling, the
complaint would be fatally defective.
In Creer et al. v. Bancroft Land & Irrigation Co., 90
Pac. 228 (Idaho), fourteen plaintiffs brought suit in equity
to compel defendants to furnish each plaintiff the amount
of water specified in his contract with defendant to be
received by him. All of the contracts were upon the same
printed form, with the same provisions except as to the
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quantity of water to be delivered to the respective plaintiffs.
In sustaining a demurrer based upon misjoinder of parties
and causes of action, the Idaho court says at page 230:
"Each of the plaintiffs bases his action upon
the contract executed to him alone. Neither of the
plaintiffs have any interest whatever in the contract
of either of the other plaintiffs. It is a well-settled
rule that two or more persons having distinct causes
of action, although against the same defendant, may
not join as plaintiffs." (Numerous cases cited.)
In Lockha.rt v. Christian et al., 219 Pac. 490 (N. M.),
after quoting a statute in substance the same as our 104-7-3,
the court says at page 491 :
"The terms of this statute are clear and free
from doubt or ambiguity. Two things are necessary
in order to properly unite more than one cause of
action. They must belong to one of the classes enumerated in the statute, and they must each affect all
of the parties to the suit."
In Holland Oil & Gas Co. et al. v. Holland et al., 220
Pac. 1044 (Kan.), it was alleged that each of the plaintiffs
had been induced to buy an interest in a worthless oil and
gas lease by identical misrepresentations made to each of
them. After quoting Kansas statutes in substance identical
with those of Utah, the court says at page 1045:
"In this instance the cause of action of each
plaintiff was fraud committed by false representations made to him and relied on by him to his damage.
Although under the allegations of the petition the
false representations made to the various plaintiffs
were the same, the torts committed were several. No
plaintiff was affected by the cause of action of any
other, or interested in the relief demanded by any
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other. The question whether Downing or Adams or
Puterbaugh had been defrauded to his injury was.
personal to him, and not of common or general
interest. If Downing's case should be tried and he
should recover, the necessary elements of Adams'
or Puterbaugh's cause of action would not be established."
In F. S. Harrmon & Co. v. Eastern Furniture Co. et al.,
255 Pac. 964 (Wash.), construing Washington statutes substantially like the above cited Utah sections, the court says
at page 966:
"While we have given the cited statutes a lib·
eral construction~ we have never held that two or
more causes of action could be united simply because
they arose out of contract or arose out of the same
transaction; the rule is applicable only where all of
the parties to the action are affected by all of the
causes of action."
In Baker v. Hanson et al., 231 Pac. 902 (Mont.), one
of the causes of action pleaded confessedly affected all of the
parties, but another cause of action pleaded did not. At
page 904, after quoting the Montana statute substantially
like the closing paragraph of 104-7-3, U. C. A., the court
says:
"As observed before, the cause of action upon
the claim for $650.86 does affect all of these
parties, but the cause of action upon the claim for
$1,290 does not affect the defendant Fidelity Company; hence the two causes of action cannot be
joined, and the court erred in overruling the special
demurrer to the complaint."
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In Pittsburg etc. Co. v. "J~Vakefield Hardware Co., 47
S. E. 234 (N. C.), the court, after saying that each of the
causes of action "must affect all the parties to the transaction," approves the following statement of the law at
page 234:

"It 'is not sufficient that some of the defendants
be affected by each of them. All of the defendants
must be affected by each of them to wa.rrant the
union of them in one suit."
Also see:
Felt City Townsite Co. v. Felt Investment Co.
et al., 50 Utah 364, 167 Pac. 835, at page
370 of the Utah report;
Crummer v. Wilson et al., 237 Pac. 1035 (Kan.);
Jordan et al. v. Buick Motor Co. et al., 75 Fed.
(2d) 447 (7th C. C. A.) ;
Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. et al., 297
Fed. 422 (8th C. C. A.) ;
Walser et al. v. Moran, 173 Pac. 1149 (Nev.).
Appellants seek to avoid the clear mandate of the Utah
statutes and the uniform decisions of the courts forbidding
joinders like those here attempted by stressing the great
number of plaintiffs and others alleged to be similarly
situated and the alleged multiplicity of suits to be avoided.
They forget that such considerations alone are never sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of equity, and in contending otherwise they are in conflict with Mr. Pomeroy upon
whom they so heavily lean for support.
In Pomeroy's Code Remedies (3rd Ed.) the language
of 104-3-16, U. C. A., relative to the propriety of a joinder
of several plaintiffs or a class suit where "the question is
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one of a common or general interest of many persons" is
quoted on page 454, and in his discussion of that section the
author says at page 455r:
"The suit cannot be sustained by one as the
representative of the many others who really sue
in his name, unless it could have been maintained
if all these many others had been regularly joined
as co-plaintiffs, or unless it could have been maintained by each of them suing separately and for
himself."
We seriously question appellants' interpretation of
Section 245 and other sections of Volume 1 of Pomeroy's
Equity Jurisprudence cited in their brief. Several courts
have severely criticized some of the language there employed,
and no court in any jurisdiction, state or federal, has ever
approved any such law or doctrine as that which appellants
ascribe to Mr. Pomeroy. In Section 2511;2 of said Volume 1,
Mr. Pomeroy aptly states that the jurisdiction of equity
does not exist "because of multiplicity of suits but to avoid
them" and condemns "spurious 'bills of peace,' " where, after
joinder, there would merely be "a bundle of separate suits."
Although Mr. Pomeroy has never advocated a doctrine
that would permit a joinder of plaintiffs having separate
and distinct causes of action arising out of separate and
distinct transactions where an adjudication of the claims of
one plaintiff could not operate as an adjudication of the
rights of any other plaintiff and where the claims of each
must necessarily rest on different evidence, he has approved
a more liberal rule with respect to joinder than that generally
followed. Cases like Duke et al. v. Boyd County, 7 S. W. (2d)
839 (Ky.), where the rights. of three plaintiff peace officers
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and twenty-five other peace officers to recover a fee fixed by
statute would be conclusively determined by an adjudication
as to the constitutionality of the statute illustrate this departure. But see Lile et al. v. Kefauver et al., 51 S. W. (2d)
473 (Ky.), in which the court- discusses its decision in the
Duke case. A joinder of various persons each claiming to
be a creditor of a defunct bank sought to join as plaintiffs
in a suit to recover judgment against the directors for
the respective amounts claimed by them. In support of its
conclusion that there could be no class suit or a joinder of
causes of action by two or more plaintiffs, the court says at
page 475:
"In cases where an individual creditor seeks to
recover a debt due him, there is no such community
of interest with other claimants having similar claims
as to authorize a class suit."
In Miller et al. v. Arizona Bank et al., 43 Pac. (2d) 518
(Ariz.), the text from Pomeroy relied upon by appellants is
discussed at length. At page 528 the court thus announces
what it believes to be "the true test to be applied" in determining whether there may be a class suit or a joinder of
various plaintiffs and causes of action:
"Can proof of the vital fact necessary to establish the right of one plaintiff be made by the same
evidence which is necessary to establish a corresponding right in each of the other plaintiffs?"
In the course of its opinion ( pp. 526-7) the Arizona
court quotes at length from the decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Noroian v. Bennett, 179 Pac. 158,
159, where joinder was denied because there was "no single
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fact or act, the determination of which will determine the
rights of all the plaintiffs" and because, although the causes
of action of the various plaintiffs were similar and based
upon the alleged fraud of the defendants, each was separate
and distinct from the others and not "capable of proof by
the same evidence." The opinions in the California and
Arizona cases just cited are well worth reading.
In Whiting v. Elmira Industrial Ass'n., 61 N. Y. Supp.
27, cited by appellants, suit was brought by plaintiff in
behalf of himself and others in like situation for profits
from the sale of lots alleged to be due pursuant to a contract
between the parties.. The court calls attention to the fact
that the only possible difference between the claims of
plaintiff and other parties to the contract in whose behalf
he brought suit was in the amounts to be distributed between
them and rema~ks that this difference "is more mythical than
genuine." In the later case of Brown v. W erblin et al., 244
N. Y. Supp. 209, a situation very similar to that in the case
at bar was presented. Plaintiff there brought suit for
herself and for the benefit of all others similarly situated.
She alleged that the defendants entered into a conspiracy
to reap large profits by victimizing innocent investors in
the preferred and common stocks of Advance-Rumely Company by agreeing to form a pool to acquire large blocks of
said stocks; to create a false market for same; to procure
the publication in tipsters' sheets of articles calculated to
deceive; and through various other devices recited in detail
to induce plaintiffs to buy said stocks and thus lose large
sums of money. It was further. alleged in the complaint
that profits realized in these fraudulent transactions were
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a trust fund, to which plaintiff and others similarly situated
were entitled. With reference to Sec. 195 of the Civil Practice Act of New York (in substance like 104-7-3, U. C. A.)
and the right of plaintiff to prosecute the suit, the court
says at pages 212-13 :
"A representative action cannot be maintained
unless it appears from the allegations of the complaint that the plaintiff not only has a cause of action
but that he is representative of a common or general
interest of others. Bouton v. Van Buren, 229 N. Y.
17, 127 N. E. 477. Here there is neither community
of right or interest in the subject-matter of the
action nor in the questions of law or fact involved.
Each plaintiff has a several right to recover, in an
action at law, the damage, if any, sustained by reason
of defendants' fraud. Each plaintiff's action is necessarily predicated upon the facts which induced him
to act. The right of each individual is not derivative.
It must stand on allegations and proof peculiar to
itself and dissociated from the others. None has an
interest in the cause of action or the damage recoverable by another. In such a case a class action may
not be maintained."

It would unduly lengthen this brief to attempt an
analysis of all the authorities cited by appellants. They consist of cases like White v. Texas Co. et al., 59 Utah 180, holding that officers of a corporation, like other persons, are
liable for damages occasioned by their fraud; that class
suits by taxpayers and depositors of the usual type are not
forbidden; that all beneficiaries of a trust fund, as well as
parties to a single contract, including third party beneficiaries, may properly join in any suit to protect their common
rights; that where the rights of all plaintiffs are dependent
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upon the same question and will be determined upon the
same evidence, such plaintiffs and their causes of action
may be united in one complaint.
In 114 A. L. R., beginning on page 1015, appears an
annotation of numerous authorities touching the question
of joinder in suits like the case at bar. At page 1016 reference is made to Mr. Pomeroy's discussion of the subject,
and after quoting from Section 269, 1 Pomeroy's Equity
Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), the editor seems to indicate an
uncertainty as to just what the text means.. He says, how.ever:
"Whatever support the text statement above
quoted may have in the cases generally, it seems that
the doctrine stated by the learned author has not
thus far been so applied as to permit the maintenance of a representative tort action based on similar frauds separately practiced by the same defendant upon different individuals."
Immediately following, on the same page, the editor
.says with reference to class suits in equity:
"Class or representative suits to obtain the recission of transactions based on similar frauds practiced by one defendant upon various, and commonly
numerous, persons, have so often been held not
maintainable that one may well doubt whether under
any circumstances such a suit will lie. One of the
basic difficulties is not merely that the various
transactions are legally distinct, but that each case
is, or at least may prove to be, to some extent different. Even where the false representations were
exactly the same, the various persons victimized
may have acted upon different opinions and beliefs
.as to the facts; one may have relied upon one sup-
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posed fact, another upon a different one, and some
may have largely acted upon their own judgment as
to business possibilities, etc. Furthermore, each has
an election of remedies, all may not desire the same
relief, and some may not be entitled to any relief.
In some cases the interests of the various victims
may be conflicting."
On page 1019 the following statement with reference

to law actions is made :
"Thus far, neither under existing codes nor
under general rules of law, has a representative action to recover damages for similar frauds practiced
on numerous persons been upheld. In general, the
objections to such suits seem to be the same as those
applying to representative suits to rescind for fraud;
namely, that the demands of the various defrauded
parties are not only legally distinct, but each depends upon its own facts, and that a material difference in facts may exist. Furthermore, a choice
of remedies is ordinarily presented, and the plaintiff
cannot know that other persons similarly situated
will not elect to affirm the fraudulent transaction."
The annotation contains numerous citations from many
jurisdictions.

A vast number of other decisions fully

support the text. But in view of the fact that no authority
has been found by us or Mr. Walton or Mr. Pomeroy or
the editor of A. L. R. which supports appellants' contention that they may unite their several causes of action in
one complaint or prosecute a class suit, it would seem
unnecessary to amplify our citations touching this question.
In Linden Land Co. et al.

v. Milwaukee Ry.

& Lighting
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Co. et al., 83 N. W. 851 (Wis.), in refusing to permit a class
suit,. the court says, at page 856 :
"The theory of the action, where one properly
sues for all, is that the result is conclusive on all
who are similarly situated, and whom the plaintiff
rightfully represents; and such must be the theory,
or else the plaintiff does not represent all, and the
statement that he does is not only false, but absurd."
Even were it possible to assume that the named plaintiffs in this suit have a clear right to join and recover a
money judgment for breach of contract andjor damages for
fraud andjor rescission and to prosecute for "the use and
benefit of defendant" Association the alleged cause of
action for fraudulent conveyance of assets to Colonial Corporation and to obtain the appointment of a receiver of
the assets of both the Association and Colonial Corporation
because of insolvency and to obtain a liquidation of the
Association and a distribution of its assets, would such manifold adjudication or any part of it be "conclusive on all
who are similarly situated"?
Perhaps, in at least some instances, the "various property" for which others alleged to be similarly situated sold
or traded their stock is now worth much more than the face
value of their certificates. Especially if the financial condition of the ·Association is as bad as that painted in the
.complaint, there may be many "others similarly situated"
who would much prefer to retain the "various property"
by them received than be reinstated as stockholders. But
however this may be, they and not the named plaintiffs have
the right to decide whether they wish to rescind or abide
by the transaction pursuant to which they disposed of their
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stock.

As expressly held by this Court in the Cook case,

supra (69 Utah 161), this right of decision is vested in the

defrauded party. It may not be exercised by any other person, however benevolent his purpose may be.
If funds of the Association have been wrongfully disbursed and its assets fraudulently conveyed as alleged and
were the absurd statement of its insolvency true, would
appellants' claimed right to prosecute a class suit and make
the necessary election for "others similarly situated" be
thereby fortified? Would not the alleged financial misfortunes and difficulties of the Association be an added reason why "others similarly situated" would have the exclusive
right and authority to make their own decision?
Among other conclusive reasons why appellants inay
not be permitted to speak for "others similarly situated"
is that they do not allege· and cannot possibly know whether
such "others" believed or acted in reliance upon any alleged
false representation or when any alleged fraud was discovered by such "others" or the circumstances surrounding
such discovery.
Another reason why there is a fatal misjoinder of
causes of action will be discussed in the subtitle next below
appearing.
The Association Is Made Both a Plaintiff
and a Defendant
In their complaint appellants allege that the "defendants have wrongfully misappropriated and diverted from
the treasury of said Building and Loan Association large
sums of money for excessive salaries to the said Dyes and
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illegitimate expenses in the commission of said frauds"
and pray for an accounting therefor by the defendants.
A fraudulent conveyance by the Association to Colonial
Corporation is alleged (R. 6) and judgment is sought against
Colonial Corporation to the use of defendant Association
for an accounting and return to the treasury of assets thus.
conveyed. Insolvency of said two corporations is alleged,
and a receiver to take charge of their assets is demanded,
a liquidation and distribution of the assets of the Association being also prayed (R. 7).
These demands may not be joined in a single suit
brought by one plaintiff or by any number of plaintiffs.
In Blake et al. v. Boston Develpment Co. et al., 50 Utah
347, 167 Pac. 672, suit was brought by stockholders against
a corporation and its officers and directors. It was alleged:
that the corporation was dominated by one of the directors,
to wit, Vahrenkamp; that at the time of its incorporation
all of defendant corporation's stock was transferred to
Vahrenkamp in consideration of the conveyance by him to
the company of three worthless mining claims; that company affairs had been grossly mismanaged; that various
property and funds of the company had been fraudulently
taken over by Vahrenkamp without consideration; that
defendant officers and directors had permitted Vahrenkamp
to take large blocks of company stock without any payment
therefor and had permitted him by false credits on the books
to avoid payment of assessments that had been levied upon
outstanding stock which outsiders, including plaintiffs, had
been compelled to pay; and that certain assessments had
been unlawfully and fraudulently levied. Unlike the com-
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plaint in the case at bar, it was alleged due effort had been
made to secure corporate action in the premises. In their
prayer plaintiffs asked: that the corporation and defendant
officers and directors be enjoined from selling stock to pay
a recent assessment improperly levied; that defendants be
required to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed; that certain former assessments alleged to be unlawful be declared fraudulent and void; that the individual
defendants be required to make a full accounting in the
premises; and that they might have general relief. The
complaint was attacked upon the following grounds: "that
separate and independent causes of action are commingled;
that there are several causes of action improperly united
in the comJ;llaint; that there is a cause of action stated in
favor of the corporation and against the officers and directors of the corporation; and another alleged cause of action
is stated against the incorporation for an injunction, and
still another to annul and set aside certain assessments,
and a further cause of action on behalf of the plaintiffs for
personal relief" (pp. 3,52-3 of the Utah report). The trial
court sustained the motion and demurrers based upon the
foregoing grounds, and upon plaintiffs' refusing to plead
further entered judgment dismissing the action.
At page 354 this Court concurs in the holding of the
Alabama decision there cited that although a stockholder
may sue to protect the rights of the corporation where it
fails to do so itself "that will not justify the joining of
causes of action for and against the corporation." At pages
355-6 this Court says :
"The fact, however, that the corporation does
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not bring the action for itself in its own name does
not give the plaintiffs, who are acting on behalf of
the corporation, the right to join causes of action
in one complaint that the corporation could not have
joined, and of course, they, under no circumstances,
have the right to commingle several causes of action
in one statement. The attempt, therefore, to join
a cause of action to enjoin the corporation from
collecting certain assessments, which we have seen
is a cause of action against the corporation, with one
for an accounting against the officers and directors
of the corporation, which is a cause of action in its
favor, cannot be sustained."
In Beal v. United Properties Co., 189 Pac. 346 (Cal.)
(a case very pertinent to other phases of misjoinder earlier
discussed), after stating that assets of a corporation illegally
dissipated should be returned to it as claimed by plaintiff
in the complaint, the court says:

"It is manifest, however, that he cannot join
such an action (wherein he is suing as a trustee of
the corporation and in the nature of a guardian) with
an action in his own behalf wherein he is seeking
personal relief."
Also see: James v. Steifer Mining Co., 171 Pac.
117 (Cal.).
The causes of action for an accounting and to set aside
the claimed fraudulent conveyance to Colonial Corporation
as alleged could, of course, be only derivative. Pursuant
to the allegations and prayer of the complaint, title to such
causes of action is in defendant Association. That appellants sue as stockholders and not as creditors conclusively
appears from various allegations of the complaint, including
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the emphatic statements in paragraph 13 thereof (R. 4)
that the alleged claims of the Association that appellants'
stock has been retired, paid and canceled and that they
have no rights or interest therein "are wholly without right"
and the prayer of the complaint (R. 7) "that it be adjudged
that they are still the owners of said certificates." Any
possible question as to the status in which they sue is
further removed by paragraph 5 of the prayer (R. 7) wherein they expressly seek judgment against Colonial Corporation "for an accounting and return to the treasury" of the
Association of assets alleged to have been turned over to
Colonial Corporation. Such a judgment would, of course,
be entirely foreign to a suit by a creditor seeking to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance; he seeks and, if successful,
is granted direct recourse against the conveyed property
to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim. On page 15
of appellants' brief "the main contention of the plaintiffs"
is stated to be "that they are entitled to be regarded as
still members and shareholders of the building and loan
association."
At various places in appellants' brief mention (without
argument) is made of "insolvency," "trust fund," "prorating," and other subjects often pertinent in cases where numerous parties may properly be joined. But insolvency of
one or more defendants or the existence of a trust fund or
a necessity for prorating are not specified in 104-7-3, U. C.
A. as reasons for avoiding its mandate that all causes of
action sued on "must all belong to one" of the specified
classes and "must affect all the parties to the action." In a
large percentage of equity suits similar to the case at bar~
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the complaint contained some or all of the following allegations: insolvency of a corporate defendant primarily liable
to plaintiff, with demand for a receiver of its assets; right
.of recourse against a trust fund and a necessity for prorating. Among such cases (each of which is very pertinent to
the questions of misjoinder here involved) are the following:

Ballew Lumber & Hardware Co. et al. v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. et al., 232 S. W. 1015
(Mo.);
Rural Credit Subscribers' Ass'n. et al. v. Jett et
al., 266 S. W. 240 (Ky.) ;
Brown v. W erblin et al., 244 N. Y. Supp. 209,
supra;
Stewart et al. v. Ficken et al., 149 S. E. 164
(S. C.);
Spear et al. v. Greene Co. et al., 140 N. E. 795
(Mass.);
Lile et al. v. Kefauver et al., 5,1 S. W. (2d) 473
(Ky.), supra.
THE DEMURRERS FOR UNCERTAINTY
Even the author of appellants' brief will doubtless con"Cede that the four and a half pages devoted to the special
demurrers are somewhat sketchy. Replying in kind we
might simply refer to the demurrers with no further comment than our statement that they were properly sustained.
Of the two pages of appellants' brief on this question which
do not consist of mere dogmatic statement, one and a half
pages are directed to Ground 24 of the demurrer, which
attacks the complaint because it contains no explanation
of why the alleged frauds or the facts constituting same
,were not earlier discovered. On page 16 of their brief

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

27
appellants say that this "demurrer raises a question which
deserves and demands the consideration of the court." Two
Kansas cases with one from New Mexico and another from
Washington are cited in support of the complaint's allegation. Here at last appellants have been able to discover pertinent authority adverse to a ruling of the trial court.
We believe their discovery "deserves and demands the consideration of the court." But unfortunately the better
reasoning and the overwhelming weight of authority are
against them even on this point. That a plaintiff commencing suit for fraud after the limitation period has elapsed,
in order to avoid the statute, must not only set forth in
his complaint the time when he discovered the fraud but
also the circumstances attending such discovery is announced
without qualification in the following texts :
37 C. J., pp. 1200 et seq.;
34 Am. J ur ., Sec. 425;
4 Sutherland Code Pleading, Practice and Forms,
Sec. 6888.
Among the numerous decisions following the doctrine
announced in the above cited texts are the following:

Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135;
Hardt v. Heidweyer, 152 U.S. 547;
Lady Washington Consolidated Co. v. Wood et
al., 45 Pac. 809 (Cal.}-a leading and frequently cited case;
Davis v. Rite-Lite Sales Co. et al., 67 Pac. (2d)
1039 (Cal.), at 1041-2.
The action of the trial court in sustaining the general
demurrer to the alleged cause of action of "others similarly
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situated" (Ground 8) is not assigned as error. On page 14
of their brief appellants refer to this demurrer as Ground
12 and say that it became wholly immaterial because the
court sustained the motion to strike the various references
in the complaint to "others similarly situated." It seems
to us that this statement in the brief puts the cart before
the horse. Of course the sole reason for striking out the
language specified in the motion was because the court
found that no cause of action was stated in favor of ·such
other persons.
This brief is already longer than we had intended.
Because our grounds of uncertainty necessarily indicate
the precise subject of attack and require little if any elucidation, and because appellants have been so sparing of argument and citation touching the trial court's rulings on the
questions thus presented, we shall leave this phase of the
case after inviting attention to a few of the obvious defects
found by the trial court of so grave a nature that, as we
believe, no court would approve them.
On page 15 of their brief appellants dispose of Grounds
13, 15, 17 and 23 with the statement that the uncertainties
-there complained of are peculiarly within the knowledge
of the defendants. We invite attention to those subdivisions
of the demurrer (R. 27-30) and the uncertainties there
indicated. For example, the statement of the complaint
that during the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, through its
agents, defendant Association came into possession of appellants' certificates which had been parted with by plaintiffs without receiving anything but "various property"
having no "substantial value" is attacked as uncertain
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because the complaint contains no allegation of the nature,
identity or value of said "various property" or of the meaning or intended meaning of the words "substantial value"
or of the manner in which or from whom defendant Association came into possession of the certificates (Ground 13),
or what officer or agent of corporate defendants or any of
them took part in the alleged transactions with appellants
(Ground 14), or how or in what manner the alleged fictitious and sham market was created or manipulated or
depressed or when or where such action occurred, or what
if any officer or agent of any corporate defendant thus
acted in its behalf (Ground 15), or what consideration was
actually paid to plaintiffs or any of them for their certificates (Ground 17), or the occasion, identity or nature of
any transaction or transactions pursuant to which plaintiffs
or any of them parted with possession of their certificates
(Ground 23).
If appellants' idea of what constitutes a good and
sufficient pleading is correct, A's complaint for an alleged
breach of contract by B would be a model of perfection
if it merely set forth: that B through some unnamed
agent on some unnamed occasion entered into a contract
with him; that B breached the contract; and that as a result
of such breach A had been damaged. When asked by special
demurrer to disclose the identity of the alleged agent and
the agreed consideration and other terms and provisions
of the alleged contract~\ might, with just impatience, reply
that those minor details were all peculiarly within B's
knowledge. If the demurrer were sustained A would, of
course, refuse to amend and would appeal to this Court.
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If instead of being thus wronged by breach of contract
A alleged that sometime, somewhere B's agent had fraudulently induced him to exchange his cow for "various property," any inquiry as to the identity of the alleged agent or ,
as to the "various property" or the facts and circumstances
surrounding and identifying the alleged transaction would,
as appellants contend, be as to matters peculiarly within
B's knowledge. In the illustrations given, as in the case
at bar, A and not B was present on the occasion complained
of. A certainly had first hand knowledge of the alleged
transaction; he knew the person with whom he dealt and
the identity of the "various property" by him received. B's
knowledge would necessarily be based upon hearsay. In
the case at bar is there some undisclosed reason why appellants do not wish to reveal the names of the alleged agents
with whom they dealt or the nature and identity of the
"various property"?
In support of their contention that the demurrers for
uncertainty were improperly sustained, appellants cite Industrial Commission v. Wasatch Grading Co,., 80 Utah 223,
on page 19 of their brief and there say: "Less certainty
is required where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the adversary." We agree with that statement
and with the cited case from which it was apparently
taken. On page 235 of 80 Utah, immediately preceding
such statement, this Court says that a complaint should
contain "an averment of facts with such certainty as will
reasonably inform the defendant what is proposed to be
proved so that he may have a fair opportunity to meet
the alleged facts and prepare his defense." We earnestly
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mtend that the yardstick thus fixed should be applied in
tis case.
~

ANY GENERAL OR SPECIAL DEMURRER WAS
PROPERLY SUSTAINED, THE JUDGMENT
MUST BE AFFIRMED

Pursuant to the elementary rule that a judgment of a
,wer court will be affirmed if there is any ground upon
hich to sustain it, the judgment of dismissal here appealed
·om must be affirmed if the trial court was right in any
:the rulings complained of.
Further citation than the three cases next below cited
ould seem to be unnecessary.
In Davie v. Board of Regents, 227 Pac. 243 (Cal.), the
mrt says at page 247:

"If the complaint is insufficient upon any ground
properly specified in the demurrer the order must
be sustained, though the lower court may have
deemed it sufficient in that respect and may in its
order have declared it defective only in some particular in which tee hold it to be good."
In Haddad v. McDowell et al., 3 Pac. (2d) 550 (Cal.),
demurrer was filed for uncertainty, misjoinder of parties
{endant, joinder of several causes of action without statg them separately, and failure to state facts sufficient
constitute a cause of action. At page 551 the court says:
"If the demurrer is well taken as to any of the
grounds stated therein, then the order of the court
sustaining the demurrer must be affirmed by the
reviewing court."
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In State v. Oklahoma City et al., 168 Pac. 227 (Okla.),
in harmony with the well-settled rule with respect to judgments appealed from, the court says at page 230:
"The order sustaining the demurrer expressly
states that it was based upon the second ground
thereof, which we have discussed. However, in
passing upon the correctness of the court's ruling, J
we are not confined to the reasons given for sus- .
taining the demurrer and dismissing the plaintiff's J
cause of action or to the particular grounds of the .!
demurrer, but will consider all of the grounds assigned and sustain the order if any of such grounds ~
are well taken."
;
After having obtained many extensions of time within
which to file an amended complaint, appellants elected tor
stand on their pleading. As stated in the Davie case, supra
(p. 247) : "Having done so, the judgment on demurrer will
not be reversed merely in order to allow an amendment."
Respectfully submitted,
STUART P. DOBBS,
STEPHENS, BRAYTON & LOWE,
P. T. FARNSWORTH, JR.,

Attorneys for Respondents Ogden;
First Federal Savings and Loant)
A_ssocia.tion, Colonial Corpora-;
twn, M. L. Dye and S . G. Dye;
1

~
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